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This is a reply to the comment1 by Yuan et al .
on our publication2.
We are glad that our results have led to awareness and
discussions of imperfections in the detectors, among the
leading research groups on avalanche-photodiode-based
(APD-based) quantum key distribution (QKD) systems.
Yuan et al. propose a method1 to avoid blinding of
gated APD-based detectors, such as the ones used in the
two commercial QKD systems addressed in our recent
publication2. Our experimental data from Clavis2 indi-
cate that the countermeasure suggested by Yuan et al. will
make it more difficult to blind gated detectors.
However, for gated detectors avoiding blinding is insuffi-
cient to avoid our attack. Gated detectors operate in linear
mode between the gates. Therefore the trigger pulse can be
applied right after the gate (discarding these clicks based
on arrival times seems to be impractical due to detector
jitter). We remarked that this causes afterpulses2, but in
fact the after-gate attack can fully compromise the security
for a wide range of system parameters3. Even outside this
range, one must quantify in a proof of security how well
Eve may perform. Removing the bias resistor and low-
ering the comparator threshold does not avoid exploiting
the linear mode between gates. In fact, lowering the com-
parator threshold reduces the required trigger pulse power,
and thus likely improves the after-gate attack by reducing
afterpulsing.
Furthermore, it seems that the detectors can still be
blinded, even with the changes proposed by Yuan et al.
Simply removing the bias resistor has turned out to be
insufficient. In our recent paper4, we removed the bias re-
sistor from the detectors in Clavis2. Still, we were able
to blind the detectors in several ways. Yuan et al. did
not observe thermal blinding from continuous-wave (c.w)
illumination. This may be due to the lower comparator
threshold and/or insufficient heating (they illuminate one
instead of two APDs, while operating at a higher temper-
ature, effectively increasing cooler capacity).
Even if the bias resistor is removed, and the discrimina-
tion level is set just above the capacitive charging signal
the detectors seem to be vulnerable to sinkhole blinding4.
In sinkhole blinding, the APD is illuminated between the
gates. With a suitable duty cycle of the blinding illumi-
nation, it should be straightforward to blind the detector
while keeping the comparator input well below the ampli-
tude of the capacitive signal.
Monitoring photocurrent of the APDs is like using a
power meter at Bob’s entrance, which we have already
discussed in our original paper2. Furthermore, it will not
reveal the after-gate attack.
It seems that the countermeasure proposed by Yuan et
al.1 does not prevent our general attack of tailored bright
illumination2. Note that so far, we have been able to
blind and control every APD-based detector which we have
looked thoroughly at (although with different techniques),
including three different passively quenched detectors5,
one actively quenched detector6, and two different gated
detectors2–4.
In our opinion, the discussion shows how important it
is to close this loophole in a thorough, preferably prov-
able way. We doubt that this could be achieved efficiently
in small increments of intuitive patches, causing rapid it-
erations and forcing manufacturers to update their QKD
systems frequently. We are confident that APD-based sin-
gle photon detectors can be, and will be made secure by
a proper implementation combined with a sufficiently gen-
eral security proof.
As a final remark, we want to emphasize that in our
experiments2–4, the QKD systems were treated as black
boxes just as they would be for Eve. We reverse-engineered
the detector circuitries (realistically, Eve can buy a copy
of Bob and do the same), and non-intrusively recorded the
detector response during our experiments. Clavis2 shipped
with factory settings ready for QKD, including the dis-
crimination level, which we used for our experiments. As
pointed out in our Supplementary Information2, QPN 5505
did not ship with factory settings, but we followed the
manual and used the settings which gave us the best QKD
performance.
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